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PAMELA BANTING 
 
From Beowulf through Virginia Woolf  
to the Coastal Wolves of British Columbia:  
Animals, Interdisciplinarity and  
the Environmental Humanities 
 
 
 
Animals are good to think, as Claude Lévi-Strauss wrote, but for the most part universities are 
dominated by a single suborder: simians. And simians who also happen to be humanists (and by 
humanists I am referring not only to those in Humanities faculties but to the professoriate at 
large) can be resistant to discourses about species other than our own, except in faculties, 
departments, and sub-disciplines such as biology, ethology, primatology, or veterinary science. 
If, as John Berger has argued, other-than-human animals can no longer return the human gaze, 
is it equally true or a simple corollary that humanists cannot return the gaze of the animal? 
Theorizing ‘the animal’ from within an English department can meet with additional obstacles. 
Within such a context, animals (if they are thought of at all) are almost always treated as 
symbolic. In his essay “Poetic Animals and Animal Souls,” Randy Malamud writes: “In Western 
culture, generally, interest in animals rings hollow. It is rote or symbolic, possessing a 
diminutive cultural currency. Animals and animal imagery are ubiquitous, but the importance 
we accord them is shallow. Politically, aesthetically, and sociologically, animals are perpetually 
subaltern” (269). To me, symbolic animals are less good to think than the animate ones. 
Ironically, English departments are both architecturally and functionally modelled along the 
lines of a zoo or a natural history collection, stocked as they are with two or three 
representative ‘specimens’ per literary period, ranging from Beowulf to Virginia Woolf and 
beyond. Some of the specimens, the professors, have individual rooms with a view while 
others, sessional instructors and graduate students, are often housed in shared internal spaces 
with no view and no natural light. The creatures best adapted to the small cages and artificial 
light and routines thrive while some others, like the tiger or the hyena at the zoo, can end up 
pacing back and forth in psychological disarray.  
In the classroom, teaching texts about animals is often inflected by the fact that many 
contemporary urban students seem to have had a fairly limited range of experiences of wild 
animals. The point Robert Michael Pyle makes in his essay “A Local Connection”—that with 
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local extirpations or extinctions of species comes a corresponding extinction of human 
experience—seems to be borne out in the classroom. For some students, their primary and 
often their sole referent for live animals is their family pet, so much so that some find it difficult 
to put him or her into the background while we read texts about wild animals. In a graduate 
seminar I taught, one student decided that it would be a great idea to deliver his entire seminar 
presentation from the point of view of a paper bag puppet representing his dog. Even while 
reading philosophy, theory, fiction, nonfiction, and poetry about wild animals, he seemed 
almost helpless to set the family dog aside for a while.  
Another challenge comes in doing interdisciplinary work without having been trained in 
interdisciplinary methodologies. Although many Canadian universities have adopted 
interdisciplinarity as a pillar or post of their mandate (such metaphors are often architectural 
and privilege the built as opposed to the natural world), they seldom provide tangible support 
for such work. In my observation from within a former Faculty of Humanities (now Arts), 
interdisciplinary research is often interpreted to mean work within a single discipline but 
carried out across a couple of different languages, not work that actually traverses disciplines. 
Faculty with genuinely interdisciplinary degrees and research tend to be regarded as neither 
fish nor fowl by those with more traditional degrees.  
At times epistemological divides can seem like yawning and slippery glacial crevasses. In their 
essay “Hybrid Vigor: Interbreeding Cultural Studies and Human-Animal Studies,” Annie Potts 
and Philip Armstrong discuss the interdisciplinary potential of hybridizing cultural studies and 
human-animal studies. They encapsulate the differences between cultural studies and scientific 
methodologies:  
One of the main challenges in teaching and learning CS [Cultural Studies] is the depth 
and durability of the split between scientific and humanistic forms of knowledge. 
Humanities disciplines place a high value on interpretive, speculative, critical, analytic, 
textual, and historiographical work. In contrast, the sciences and social sciences seek to 
reduce the speculative and interpretive elements of knowledge production in favor of 
the accumulation and analysis of empirical data according to more or less orthodox 
methodological protocols that are designed to eliminate interpretive variables. CS seeks 
to span this major epistemological divide. (8-9) 
My own research over the past several years has been on literary nonfiction by park wardens 
and former guides and outfitters who became environmental activists. Writing about texts by 
Andy Russell, Charlie Russell, Sid Marty, Karsten Heuer, and others has presented me with 
trepidations I have seldom encountered in any of my other research. Partly as a result of such 
difficulties, along with the general neglect in Canadian universities both of animals and of 
literary nonfiction other than life writing by and about simians, little to no scholarly work has 
been published on books by writers who have spent vast amounts of time outside in wilder 
places. As a result, in most cases, one is starting from scratch, though this can be both a 
disadvantage and an advantage.  
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Working in ecocriticism and animal studies can induce an entirely novel form of the anxiety of 
authorship. Having done my doctorate on the history and milieu of the long poem, and then 
having made a very deep and broad foray into ecocriticism, I ask myself a lot of questions as I 
venture again and again into examining literary nonfiction about grizzly bears, black bears, 
wolves, whales, tigers, cougars, and salmon. Unfortunately, the high school I attended was too 
small and had too few resources to hire a biology teacher. Because I lacked any high school 
courses in biology, when I went to university the only science credit I was allowed to take was 
Earth and Planetary Sciences (Rocks and Stars). Because I lack any training in biology, one 
significant risk is that, even with extensive research, I might write something truly stupid about 
animals. The spectre of personal and professional embarrassment rears its ugly head. However, 
I take both caution and consolation from poet and essayist Gary Snyder who writes that 
“Perhaps one should not talk (or write) too much about the wild world: it may be that it 
embarrasses other animals to have attention called to them” (21).  
Compounding one’s fears of making serious errors is the fear of theorizing about such animals 
on the basis of one’s own relatively scant experience with them. Bracketing childhood visits to 
the nuisance grounds to watch the black bears plough through human garbage, my own 
personal encounters with bears tally so far at three black bears and one grizzly. How can such a 
person possibly do justice to accounts of bears by people whose bear experiences and 
encounters number in the thousands of hours? By what right and with what credentials exactly 
do I analyze these writers’ texts? What if I lead myself or someone else astray with regard to 
these occasionally dangerous creatures as I move across areas of research involving philosophy, 
literary theory, textual analysis, biology, psychology, anthropology, and semiotics?  
Further amplifying individual, cultural and species blind spots, I would suggest that researchers’ 
natural fears of large predators like tigers, bears, and wolves may infiltrate such work. It can be 
difficult to think ‘objectively’ about a tiger that kills and eats a poor Russian peasant, even a 
poacher, as in John Vaillant’s The Tiger: A True Story of Vengeance and Survival or a grizzly that 
half-kills a couple of hikers because it thinks they are competition for its food cache as in 
Patricia Van Tighem’s The Bear’s Embrace: A True Story of Surviving a Grizzly Bear Attack. Such 
narratives remind us powerfully of our own animality and even, in such cases, of our status as 
potential prey. These are not feelings or responses with which one usually has to contend while 
working on the lyric, the dramatic monologue, or the Petrarchan sonnet. Texts about grizzly 
bears and Amur tigers require that analysis be monitored to guard against blind species loyalty 
and personal dread. While ethics and etiquette, along with FOIP legislation and Ethics Review 
Boards, may protect members of vulnerable groups when it comes to researchers writing about 
human Others, where is the safety net for animals when it comes to informed, fair, and non-
exploitative representations of more-than-human others? Unconscious processes such as 
projection and transference are not out of the question just because a text is about a more-
than-human animal, and they can be particularly difficult to detect, identify, and take into 
account.  
There are also conundrums when one attempts to theorize animal subjectivity and points of 
view. For example, while working on an article about Sid Marty’s nonfiction book The Black 
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Grizzly of Whiskey Creek, many chapters of which are written as if from one of two bears’ points 
of view, one of the nodes I wanted to explore was bears’ olfactory sensibilities in relation to 
sense of place. Other than Marty’s own text, it was difficult to find research beyond the 
statistical about bears’ sense of smell, but I found some delectable research material on 
humans’ sense of smell. Applying what I found on humans’ senses of smell would not be 
appropriate, however, given that bears can out-sniff humans by an exponential factor and their 
ideas of what smells good (e.g. carrion, rotting garbage, outhouses) are generally the opposite 
of what humans find appealing.  
The outpouring of recent research on the ontology and epistemology of more-than-human 
animals has taken us a long way toward increased understanding of our fellow creatures’ lives. 
However, explorations of such animals’ own being and knowledge (and not just our 
relationships with and knowledge of them) often run aground on the shoals of charges of 
anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. If a more-than-human animal trait is one shared 
with humans, then contrary to logic and common sense that trait is often regarded either as 
exclusively human or one that it is simply impossible to know animals share. As Marcus Bullock 
writes, “That steadfast refusal to see expressiveness anywhere [other than in humans] merely 
becomes another species of anthropomorphism, should we turn so intently against the other 
temptation as to insist on hearing only silence and seeing only empty matter in the language of 
animal forms” (112). While in many instances human intentions and human emotions can also 
only be inferred and sometimes too they can seem incomprehensible or bizarre (I would add 
that it is another form of anthropocentrism to hold as one’s premise that the psyches of other 
humans are understood), nevertheless more-than-human animals typically function as a limit-
case when it comes to ontology and epistemology: we do not and cannot know anything about 
their umwelten. Or, to put it another way, there be dragons. 
But one of the most daunting, though exhilarating, challenges for the animal studies researcher 
is the fact that every species is distinct and plays a different role in the ecosystem in which that 
species lives. Moving in one’s research from, say, the poetry of one writer to that of another—
even across national borders or historical timelines or from critical studies in poetry to a focus 
on fiction—is not as time-intensive or intimidating a transition as that of spending a few years 
working on grizzly bear narratives and then switching to narratives about wolves. Doing a lot of 
research on bears leaves one more or less completely unprepared to work on a text about 
wolves.  
When Western-educated humans think about more-than-human animals we tend to think of 
them in terms of their unique identifying traits: their physical appearance and a set of observed 
and scientifically validated characteristics and behaviours. We think of them occupying specific 
habitats or ecological niches and going about their utilitarian business—being born and raised, 
leaving the burrow or nest, and then reproducing and raising their own young in turn—within 
the confines of ranges that supply no more than the essentials of life. That is, as any field guide 
or nature documentary demonstrates, we tend to think of other animals’ lives and occupancy 
of the earth mostly as restricted to maintaining access to the simple, bare necessities of water, 
food, safety, shelter, and reproduction. In terms of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, we reserve 
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“sense of belonging” and other higher needs for ourselves: we seldom think of animals as 
having a sense of belonging or a sense of place. Anthropocentrism is operant too in this 
tendency of ours to think of more-than-human animals solely in terms of relatively abstract 
notions such as space, habitat, range, territory, and ecological niche but not in terms of their 
having a sense of place, even though it is probable that most non-human animals have a far 
greater knowledge of the particularities of their respective territories than we do of ours. It is as 
if we deploy abstract or scientific notions of spatiality as a way of rooting them out of and 
appropriating for ourselves the fields, meadows, fens, coulees, mountainsides, swamps, and 
especially the prime real estate they occupy. Through manoeuvres such as this, we draw them 
out of their geographical places and into rhetorical places and scientific-philosophical spaces in 
our own minds. As I discovered while researching animals’ sense of place, even a significant 
number of articles in the field of animal geographies that contain the word ‘place’ in their titles 
or abstracts tend to treat animals’ use of places as symbolic and/or ideological placements 
rather than material, physical locations.  
The obverse is also true. That is, anthropocentrism also comes into play in our assumption that 
our own sense of place is not related to nurture or satisfaction of our basic Maslovian needs. 
While knowing the particulars of one’s territory is not necessarily tantamount to possessing a 
sense of place, which implies feelings of belonging in or to that zone constructed out of 
associations, memories, and stories, I think there is sufficient cause to extrapolate from 
animals’ superb navigational and threat-avoidance capabilities based on their knowledge of the 
geographies they inhabit to consider the possibility that they may also have a sense of place. 
Consider how often a bear trucked or transported by helicopter sling far away from their home 
range into unfamiliar territory returns like the repressed within forty-eight to seventy-two 
hours. 
A corresponding absence in most of our figurations of animals is the notion of the specificity of 
individual animals’ lives, a lack I would attribute to our scepticism about their senses of place. 
Our species chauvinism causes us to imagine our furry and feathery compatriots living lives 
rendered typical, almost allegorical (a Richardson’s ground squirrel lives a species life, not the 
life of a Richardson’s ground squirrel in Calgary or one in Grasslands National Park in 
Saskatchewan). We believe that it is only emplaced lives in which history, event, or context can 
develop. Even those who recognize that humans have profound and differential historical 
effects upon other animals’ lives—through hunting, slaughter, factory farming, habitat 
depletion, fencing, neutering, and many other practices—and critique such practices tend to 
strand them in the zones of the typical and the timeless. Bear Awareness pamphlets, for 
instance, tell us what to do in the event of being approached or attacked by a black bear as 
opposed to a grizzly. While there is much validity to such categorizations and avoidance tactics, 
individual bears’ distinct histories and circumstances also shape their characters, their lives, and 
those of their offspring, and condition their responses to situations.  
It is possible, I think, without imposing the doctrine of individualism (another form of 
anthropocentrism) to acknowledge that not just every species but individual animals differ from 
one another. As Charlie Russell in Grizzly Heart: Living Without Fear Among the Brown Bears of 
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Kamchatka and Sid Marty in The Black Grizzly of Whiskey Creek show, bears, like humans, have 
different experiences, histories, personalities, and moods. In an interview for the BBC Radio 
program R3 Arts, oceanographer Sylvia Earle states that even fish show traces of individuality. 
When she was growing up in Florida, she says, there were so many more creatures in the 
ocean. Groupers, she says, would follow you around like puppy dogs when you were snorkeling, 
and she realized that they are as much individuals as cats and dogs and horses are. Every fish is 
different, she states; they have not just different faces, different arrangements of spots, stripes, 
and other markings, but they actually do have independent personalities. Some, for example, 
are more curious than others, some are more aggressive. 
In short, there are a lot of intellectual and emotional challenges in working on animals and 
animality, most of which when taken into account yield rich insights. Training in literary analysis 
and cultural studies prepares one to analyze texts and, given the poststructuralist extension of 
the notion of textuality beyond the book to other cultural phenomena, researchers in the 
humanities or the arts can make valuable contributions to our understanding of more-than-
human animals. Other-than-human animals have been the subjects of a wide range of texts and 
oral discourses including but not restricted to the following: Indigenous song, prayer, chant, 
story, pictograph, and petroglyph; the journals and diaries of so-called explorers and 
naturalists; extinction narratives; accounts of life with a pet or other domestic animals; 
memoirs of lives lived very close to nature such as narratives of backcountry living, the 
recollections of guides and outfitters, and adventure narratives; anecdotes of first-hand 
encounters; campfire stories; artistic expression such as poetry, photographs, paintings, literary 
nonfiction, and the realistic wild animal story; newspaper stories and accounts of sightings, 
encounters, and attacks; public safety pamphlets; cartoons and comic books; and medical and 
healing narratives, all of which are susceptible to a text-based analysis. Working on animals 
from within an arts/humanities discipline or across disciplines allows one to address such 
documents, few of which scientists can afford to incorporate into their research without 
drawing the suspicion and censure of their disciplinary colleagues. Textual, anecdotal, or 
narrative evidence is typically avoided by scientists on the grounds that it cannot be quantified 
or the results replicated. But what is an anecdote except an account of one’s field observations, 
and while one must certainly be vigilant against bias and personal agendas, sentimentality, the 
presence of the experimenter in proximity to animals, and other dangers mentioned above, a 
great deal of knowledge can be obtained through anecdote, story, or narrative.  
Conversely, a great deal of knowledge can be lost through denigrating, bracketing, or ignoring 
such material. As Dean Bavington, author of Managed Annihilation: An Unnatural History of the 
Newfoundland Cod Collapse, has shown in his work about the differences in perception 
between fishers and fishery scientists with regard to the numbers of cod off the East Coast, 
there are instances where folk knowledge in the form of anecdote is more reliable than 
scientific reports. As Bavington notes, “The local ecological knowledge (LEK) of inshore cod 
fishermen, once dismissed by fisheries managers as unscientific and anecdotal, is increasingly 
embraced by and integrated into new forms of cod fisheries management” (73). While it may 
be objected that researchers in the arts can only work with representations of more-than-
human animals, so too our colleagues in fields such as biology, zoology, ecology, environmental 
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studies, and environmental history work with representations of them. In addition to field 
observations, even biologists—whose research may be based on some combination of fur, 
tooth, hair, blood, or scat samples; DNA; tracks; photographs; and video images—are working 
with documents or representations of animals. The hair of the bear is not the bear itself. It is a 
part or fragment of a bear, a metonymy, specifically a synecdoche, but it is not a bear.  
To take another example, radio or satellite tracking of a more-than-human animal creates 
representations of its spatial movement. In Wired Wilderness: Technologies of Tracking and the 
Making of Modern Wildlife, Etienne Benson writes that  
Originating around 1960 at the unlikely intersection of wildlife management and military 
surveillance technologies, the use of miniaturized radio tags and collars to keep track of 
individual animals became virtually a sine qua non of wildlife research by the 1980s, 
dominating the pages of professional publications such as the Journal of Wildlife 
Management and serving as a symbol of modern wildlife conservation for observers of 
the field. (2)  
Not only do radio-tracking devices chart the movements of animals: they loop back upon and 
track the tracking of the scientists too, thrusting them into an epistemology based on 
transmission signals, graphs, maps, DNA analysis, and other technologies of representation. At 
the same time, the tracking devices and interpretive practices become signifiers of science, 
conservation, and management. Just as the device reveals, for instance, that a grizzly grazed on 
grain spilled from a boxcar, it simultaneously transmits that science was practiced here. 
However, just as reading animal behaviour is not confined to science and scientists neither is 
such semiosis confined to humans. In his book The Others: How Animals Made Us Human, Paul 
Shepard writes that  
We [humans] were latecomers in a well-established process that had gone on for fifty 
million years. The four-legged carnivores and their prey had long since learned that an 
animal, watched long enough, gradually dissolved into signs. It left the marks that came 
to represent it: footprints, urine, secretions, feces, molted antlers, scratchings and 
rubbings, gnawed stems, bones, feathers, beds, diggings, nests, tracks, and bits of fur as 
well as an immense range of sounds and smells unavailable to us. (24)  
This is more or less a précis of what biologists do: observe an animal long enough for its signs to 
become evident and assemble them in order to construct a thesis and argument, a likely story. 
Shepard’s thesis is that it was through observation and mimicry of other animals that humans 
developed survival tactics, including language and art. Other animals themselves were both 
proto-scientists and artists. Indeed, maybe ‘the animal’ is the link between science and the arts.  
As Ian McAllister describes in The Last Wild Wolves: Ghosts of the Great Bear Rainforest, 
researchers chose not to tranquillize, capture, radio-collar, or touch any of the coastal wolves 
they studied. Instead they collected only hair and scat samples for DNA analysis, took 
photographs and video, and compiled journal entries. While admitting that some of the 
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evidence of wolf and grizzly bear movements obtained through radio telemetry is 
“fascinating,”McAllister advocates for a less invasive approach to study: “All that money spent 
on helicopters and planes could have gone to field researchers, and when you have people in 
the field, gathering data by direct observation, important information is gleaned that no 
transmitter on an animal’s neck can duplicate. And regrettably, some bears died for the cause, 
killed in the snares used to set the collars on them. It doesn’t get any more invasive than that” 
(167). Using non-invasive techniques, the wolf researchers were able to track and identify 
individual wolves and packs and to observe significant cultural differences among the various 
packs, something one would be very hard pressed to do using helicopter surveillance and 
invasive methods. This kind of research is much closer to research in the arts.  
Many theoretical, political, disciplinary, practical, and personal challenges emerge as one 
attempts to think with wild animals. From the methodologies of interdisciplinary scholarship 
and the dangers of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism, to relatively scant personal 
experience with the wild animals in question, and a lack of basic training in biology or zoology, 
researching and teaching about animals can be a formidable task, especially if one wishes to slip 
the leg-hold trap of disciplinary limits in order to learn more about the lifeways of wolves and 
bears on the basis of textual representations. However, pursuing this work is intensely 
rewarding—even potentially transformative—and yields the basis for potential action and 
activism on behalf of the wild. What kinds of knowledge about wild animals do literary 
nonfiction accounts by naturalists, biologists, park wardens, and guides and outfitters 
generate? How best can we learn to think not just about but with more-than-human animals? 
An important area of discussion and debate about animals within both science and philosophy 
is the question of animal minds: are animals capable of representational thinking, and can they 
think about thinking? If assembling disparate signs into evidence of the presence or absence of 
food, safety, relationship, home range, and other variables constitutes representational 
thinking, as I would suggest it does, then doing science would be, in important ways, very 
similar to being animal. Thinking is animal. 
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